Maintaining Cross-Border Cargo Movements Between Jordan and Saudi Arabia During the COVID-19 Pandemic

One of Jordan's essential border crossings, the Al-Omari border crossing, is 1 of 3 land crossings between Jordan and Saudi Arabia and is located 160 km west of the capital city of Amman. Given its economic importance and essential role in the functioning of food supply networks across the region, Jordan undertook evidence-driven actions to keep the border crossing safely open during the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. Cross-border coordination and collaboration, specifically with international contact tracing and case management, have been critical elements of Jordan's response. While several bottlenecks and delays led to documented clusters of infections among truck drivers, this case study illustrates the use of evidence to mitigate disease exposure and spread. Plans to manage public health threats need to consider sustainable strengthened surveillance and laboratory capacities coupled with efficient cross-border communication and coordination plans implemented across multiple sectors engaged in cross-country health.

Evacuation of Refugees from Afghanistan: Health Control at the Spanish Border in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Following the announcement of the retreat of troops from Afghanistan, the Spanish Government organised the so-called "Antigone Operation" for the evacuation of Afghan collaborators. The most relevant ministries were involved in the response. The Ministry of Health, through the Foreign Health Department, performed the health control on arrival. The whole operation was conducted at an air base. It included the health control of refugees composed of temperature measurement, a basic visual control and a coronavirus disease (COVID-19) rapid antigen test for those over 12 years of age; the assessment of their basic needs (food and hygiene); identification and security procedures; and the initial administrative processing. The refugees were accommodated in a temporary facility at the base, where they waited to be transferred to their final destinations. Between 19 and 27 August 2021, 2168 refugees arrived on 17 flights; 680 of them were children under 12 years of age. One thousand four hundred and ninety-nine rapid antigen tests were performed, with one positive result. "Antigone Operation" is unprecedented in Spain and is one of the most complex operations carried out in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic required the establishment of a health control system on arrival, performed by Foreign Health, which contributed significantly to the overall success of the operation.

Assessment of infectious threats detection capacity at point of entries in Benin

Background: The International Health Regulation requires countries to establish measures at border entry points to prevent the spread of infectious threats across borders. Objective: This study assessed the capacity for the detection of infectious threats to global health security at entry points in Benin in 2021. Methods: This cross-sectional and descriptive study was conducted at 17 borders. Collection techniques included individual interview, observation, and document exploitation. Each entry point capacity was rated good if the entry point met at least 80 % of input criteria and 80 % of process criteria and 80 % of output criteria. The overall detection capacity was rated good if at least 80% of entry points had good capacity. Otherwise, the capacity was deemed insufficient. Results: The capacity for the detection of infectious threats at entry points in Benin was insufficient. There was no entry point (0.0%) that reach 80% of inputs criteria. 11.8% of them reached 80% of process criteria and 5.9% reached 80% of output criteria. There was no entry point with good detection capacity. The travelers' screening was not systematic. Only 19.4% of human travelers, 12.8% of food loads and 0.1% of animals were screened the day before the survey. Two alerts among human travelers, four among animals and one food safety alerts were detected. Health teams were present in all designated entry points, but they were only focused on Covid-19. Conclusion: Strengthening the detection system and extending it to other threats is necessary to improve the detection capacity at entry points.

Re-Starting the Cruise Sector during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Greece: Assessing Effectiveness of Port Contingency Planning.

Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreaks on board cruise ships early in the pandemic highlighted gaps worldwide in public health emergency contingency plans (PHECPs) for responding to unknown threats. To restart cruise operations in 2021 and respond to potential COVID-19 outbreaks, a major tourist-based Greek island port (Port A) developed a COVID-19 PHECP. We assessed plan effectiveness by reviewing epidemiological data and monitoring outcomes, followed by an intra-action review (IAR) analyzing three event responses. From May to December 2021, 118 calls from 23 cruise ships with 119,930 passengers were recorded, with 29 COVID-19 cases in 11 cruises on board 7 ships. No outbreak was recorded during the study period. Strengths of the introduced PHECP included commitment of senior management; a core multi-disciplinary team of local authorities/ship agents involved in design and execution; interoperability agreements for port and ships' PHECPs; cruise industry commitment to compliance; and pre-existing scenarios considering capacity needs. Central government coordination for preparedness planning at local ports is essential for successful responses. Monitoring local and country level response capacities is critical to inform planning, risk assessment, and decision-making. Immediately recording ports' response actions provides the basis to capture lessons and improve contingency plans. To facilitate communication and common response protocols between European and non-European ports, IARs should be conducted between countries.

COVID-19 pandemic in Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region: implication for capacity strengthening at Point of Entry.

Free movement between countries without a visa is allowed within the 15-country Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region. However, little information is available across the region on the International Health Regulation (IHR 2005) capacities at points of entry (PoE) to detect and respond appropriately to public health emergencies such as Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). ECOWAS and the member states can better tailor border health measures across the region by understanding public health strengths and priorities for improvement at PoEs. A comprehensive literature review was combined with a self-assessment of capacities at PoEs across the fifteen member states from February to July 2020. For the assessment, the member states completed an adapted World Health Organization (WHO) self-assessment checklist by classifying capacity for seven domains as fully, partially, or not implemented. The team implemented three focus group discussion (FGD) sessions and 13 key informant interviews (KII) with national-level border health stakeholders. Univariate analysis was used to summarize the assessment data and detailed content analysis was applied to evaluate FGD and KII results. Of the 15 member states, 3 (20%) are landlocked; 3 (20%) have more than one seaport. Eleven (73%) countries have 1 designated airport, 3 (20%) have two airports, and only one country (6.7%) has three airports. Two hundred and seventy-eight designated ground crossings were identified in 12 countries (80%). Strengths across the PoE were existence of decrees and ministerial acts in some ECOWAS countries and establishment of national taskforces for the COVID-19 response at PoE in ECOWAS. Major challenges were porous borders, poor intersectoral coordination, lack of harmonized traveler screening measures, shortage of staff, and inadequate financial resources. Despite all these challenges, there are opportunities such as leveraging the regional cross-border poliomyelitis coordination and control mechanism, and existence of networks of infection prevention and control specialists and field epidemiologists. However, political instabilities in some countries pose a threat to government commitments to PoE activities. The capacity to respond to public health emergencies at PoE in the ECOWAS region is still below IHR standard. Public health capacities at a majority of IHR-designated PoE in the 15-country region do not meet required core capacities standards.

COVID-19 Rapid Antigen Test as Screening Strategy at Points of Entry: Experience in Lazio Region, Central Italy, August-October 2020.

COVID-19 pandemic is a dramatic health, social and economic global challenge. There is urgent need to maximize testing capacity. Rapid Antigen Tests (RAT) represent good candidates for point-of-care and mass surveillance testing to rapidly identify SARS-CoV-2-infected people, counterbalancing lower sensitivity vs. gold standard molecular tests with fast results and possible recurrent testing. We describe the results obtained with the testing algorithm implemented at points of entry (airports and ports) in the Lazio Region (Italy), using the STANDARD F COVID-19 Antigen Fluorescence ImmunoAssay (FIA), followed by molecular confirmation of FIA-positive samples. From mid-August to mid-October 2020, 73,643 RAT were reported to the Regional Surveillance Information System for travelers at points of entry in Lazio Region. Of these, 1176 (1.6%) were FIA-positive, and the proportion of RT-PCR-confirmed samples was 40.5%. Our data show that the probability of confirmation was directly dependent from the semi-quantitative FIA results. In addition, the molecularly confirmed samples were those with high levels of virus and that were actually harboring infectious virus. These results support public health strategies based on early mass screening campaigns by RAT in settings where molecular testing is not feasible or easily accessible, such as points of entry. This approach would contribute to promptly controlling viral spread through travel, which is now of particular concern due to the spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants.

Effective screening strategies for detection of asymptomatic COVID-19 travelers at airport quarantine stations: Exploratory findings in Japan.

The quantitative reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction method using nasopharyngeal swabs (NPS RT-qPCR) is regarded as the reference standard for diagnosing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). However, when using NPS RT-qPCR at busy airport quarantine stations, there are constraints on testing capacity, time, travelerstolerance, and availability of personal protective equipment for quarantine officers. A feasible alternative is therefore needed to test incoming travelers, especially when passenger numbers increase with the resumption of business, tourism, and economic activities. To explore alternatives to NPS RT-qPCR, we collected nasopharyngeal, anterior nasal, and saliva samples chronologically over days 1-7 from asymptomatic COVID-19 air travelers who were under quarantine at a designated facility, and we then compared test results for 9 different methods, comprising RT-qPCR (including the reference method), loop-mediated isothermal amplification (LAMP), and qualitative and quantitative antigen testing. We evaluated sensitivity for 97 person-day samples independently to evaluate asymptomatic travelers regardless of their testing date and period of asymptomatic status upon entry. Sensitivity of the different tests varied from 46.6% to 81.0%, but this was improved from 72.7% to 100.0% when the viral load was > 10 4 copies/sample on NPS RT-qPCR. Thus, most high-risk asymptomatic travelers with higher viral load would be detected by the tests evaluated. Quantitative antigen testing using saliva samples showed 90.9% sensitivity and provided quicker results, and should be an acceptable alternative to NPS RT-qPCR at busy airport quarantine stations. We discuss the implications of our exploratory findings for establishing a comprehensive and feasible testing strategy for COVID-19 among air passengers.

SARS-CoV-2 Early Screening at the Point of Entry: Travelers From Bangladesh to Italy-July 2020.

We report phylogenetic and mutational analysis by NGS of six SARS-CoV-2 strains from patients flying from Bangladesh to Italy (July 2020). Data suggest that no further circulation of such imported strains occurred in Italy, stating the efficacy of early screening at the point of entry and supporting the importance of molecular epidemiology in monitoring the efficacy of control measures.